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COMMENT
the accused is not entitled to be heard in his own defense, nor can
he complain that his constitutional rights are infringed by the
refusal of a hearing.5 This, however, seems contrary to the funda-
mental conception of a court of justice which is condemnation only
after hearing. Thus from the above discussion it can be seen that
limitations upon an unqualified contempt power are by legislative
action and by the judiciary itself.
SUMMARY OF CONTEMPT POWER
To PUNISH SUMMARILY
Thus it seems that following the result achieved in Caldwell v.
United States, abandonment of due process requirements (notice,
hearing, and counsel) is confined to a narrow exception which in-
cludes only charges of misconduct in open court, in the presence
of the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all essential
elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, are
actually observed by the court, and where immediate punishment
is essential to prevent demoralization of the court's authority be-
fore the public.
NEGLIGENCE - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE - THE DocTrINE
OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
T HE DOCTRINE of contributory negligence and its harsh results
have been the subject of discussion by many legal writers.' At
common law the slightest negligence of the plaintiff would bar his
recovery from a negligent defendant if the plaintiff's negligence
contributed proximately to the injury.2 This doctrine was early
r Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888). Cf. re Savin, 131 U.S. 267 (1889); See Note,
57 A.L.R. 545.
1 See Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 151 (1946);
Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev. 125 (1945);
Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 Cornell L. Q. 333, 604 (1931);
Comment, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 30, 41-2 (1950).
-Bartson v. Craig, 121 Ohio St. 371, 169 N.E. 291 (1929) involved the following set
of facts: The plaintiff, a minor, was coasting on a sled on an avenue which had been
blocked off so that it could be used for that purpose, and turned the sled into another
street, where he was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant's agent. The court
instructed the jury that if they found "from the evidence that the plaintiff's own negligence
directly caused or contributed in the slightest degree to cause the injuries complained
of . . ." they should find for the defendant. On appeal this instruction was upheld. The
court said, "The essential element of contributory negligence such as to bar the recovery by
the plaintiff is not the comparative extent or degree of negligence. The test is rather whether
the negligence of the plaintiff, whatever it be, caused or directly contributed to cause the
accident and injury." See also Note, 114 A.L.R. 830 (1938).
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
suggested 3 and is followed in most jurisdictions in this country and
is well established in North Dakota.'
Many jurisdictions realizing the harshness of the contributory
negligence rule have attempted to liberalize it. Nebraska has made
one such attempt and has separated negligence into degrees with
the result that where the negligence of the plaintiff has been slight
as compared with the negligence of the defendant, an apportion-
ment of the damages is made according to relative fault.5 Another
similar plan has been to allow complete recovery when the negli-
gence of the defendant is gross or willful and wanton as compared
to the negligence of the plaintiff.6
The difficulty in defining the degrees and applying the definitions
to practical situations was expressed by the New York court when
it said, "Certainly before cases are made to turn by the verdict of
juries upon any such distinction, the judges should be able to define,
with some precision, what they mean by gross negligence, slight ne-
ligence, and ordinary negligence."7 An English court has said,
"There is no legal difference between negligence and gross negli-
gence; it is the same thing with the addition of a vituperative epi-
thet, and the question in any case is whether there was culpable
negligence." 8 A further attempt at liberalizing the contributory
negligence doctrine was the adoption of the rule of last clear
chance.9
The best answer to the unfair results of the defense of contribu-
tory negligence seems to be in the adoption of the doctrine of com-
parative negligence.'0 This doctrine is based upon the theory of ap-
portionment of damages in direct ratio to the negligence of the
parties. This apportionment was used at early civil law, and when
the negligence of the parties could not be compared they shared
&Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
' Stelter v. Northern Pac. Ry., 71 N.D. 214, 299 N.W. 310 (1941); Bagg v. Otter Tail
Power Co., 70 N. D. 704, 297 N.W. 774 (1940); Hausken v. Coman, 66 N.D. 633, 268
N.W. 430 (1936); Hutchinson v. Kinzley, 66 N.D..25, 262 N.W. 251 .(1935); Engen v.
Skeels, 60 N.D. 252, 236 N.W. 247 (1931).
5Neb. Rev. Stat. 125-1151 (1943).
6Western Ry. v. Much, 97 Ala. 194, 11 So. 894 (1892) (held contributory negligence
is no defense to an action having gross negligence as basis); Carlson v. Johnke, 57 S.D.
544, 234 N.W. 25 (1931) (contrb~utory negligence held no defense to a defendant guilty
of reckless or wanton conduct).
7 Perkins v. New York. Cent. By., 24 N.Y. 196, 207 (1862).
Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 152 Eng. Rep. 737 (1843).
'Stelter v. Northern Pac. Ry., 71 N.D. 214, 299 N.W. 310 (1941); Ramage v.
Trepanier, 69 N.D. 19, 283 N.W. 471 (1939); Hausken v. Conan, 66 N.D. 633, 268 N.W.
430 (1936); Acton v. Fargo & M. St. Ry., 20 N.D. 434, 129 N.W. 225 (1910). The
entire topic of last clear chance in North Dakota was discussed in a comment published in
26 N.D. Bar Briefs 30 (1950). See also Stokes, Laws of Negligence, 26 N. D. Bar Briefs
159 (1950).
0 See Prosser, Torts 403 (1941); 5 Wash. & Lee L., Rev, 147 (1948); 20 Miss. L.J.
99 (1948); Wis. L. Rev. 289 (1941); Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negli-
gence, 17 Cornell L. Q. 333 and 604 (1931).
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damages equally.1  Most of the world's admiralty law 12 and four
of the Canadian provinces 13 use a system of apportionment of dam-
ages. It is interesting to note, however, that Louisiana, our only
civil law state, does not follow the civil law in this respect but there
is a movement toward its adoption.1" Several of the states includ-
ing North Dakota," have used the comparative negligence doctrine
in specific cases, usually railroad accidents. The Second Federal
Employer's Liability Act 1 and the Merchant Marine Act IT adopt
its use. The doctrine simply says that where the defendant and the
plaintiff are both negligent they shall suffer their proportionate
share of the injury. Adoption of the rule does not supersede prior
statutes which have completely abrogated the defense of contribu-
tory negligence in certain situations.' 8
The first case in North Dakota using the comparative negligence
rule was based on the statute at that time which applied to all com-
mon carriers. 19 In this case a street car conductor was allowed to
recover apportioned damages although he and the company had
been guilty of negligence, the court indicating that "the doctrine
of contributory negligence is not grounded in common sense, and
is really in conflict with the laws of human nature."
There are three states which have complete tort action coverage
under comparative negligence statutes, Nebraska, Wisconsin and
Mississippi. The Nebraska statute 20 is really an exception rather
than a substitute for the contributory negligence rule. In Wiscon-
sin the plaintiff must not be guilty of more than half the negligence
attributable to his injury in order to recover.2' The Mississippi stat-
ute allows recovery of apportioned damages no matter to what ex-
tent the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the negligence of the
31 Justinian, Dig. 1 XLVI, 203; Dig. Book 50, tit. 17, rule 203.
2 The rule was established by the Brussels Maritime Convention of 1909-1910 and was
incorporated into the English Maritime Convention Act. of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, C. 57.
1"See New Brunswick Rev. Stat. c. 143 (1927); Nova Scotia Statutes c. 3 (1926);
British Columbia Statutes c. 8 (1925); Ontario Stat. 1930, 20 Geo. V, c. 27, amended
1931, 21 GCeo. V, c. 26.
1 See Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev.
125 (1945).
15See Peterson v. Fargo & M. St. Ry., 37 N.D. 440, 164 N.W. 42 (1917), construing
N.D. Comp. Laws §4804 (1913). The comparative negligence provisions of the laws
applied in the Peterson case were applicable to all cases involving common carriers. The
present law applies only to railroads, providing that in any suit by an employee, the fact
that the employee was guilty of contributory negligence is not a bar, but that damages
may be diminished in proportion to the employee's negligence. N.D. Rev. Code 549-1603
(1943).
2-41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1940).
1- 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §53 (1940).
14 Mobile & 0. Ry. v. Campbell, 114 Miss. 803, 75 So. 554 (1917).
"9Peterson v. Fargo & M. St. Ry., 37 N.D. 440, 164 N.W. 42 (1917), decided under
N.D. Comp. Laws 14804 (1913). See also Koofos v. Great Northern Ry., 41 N.D. 176,
170 N.W. 859 (1918).
" Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-1151 (1943).
1 Wis. Stat. §331.045 (1947).
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defendants. 22 Neither state allows recovery under the doctrine when
more than two parties are involved in the accident.23 Comparative
neglignce has been held to apply in all tort cases 24 and to be ap-
plicable to municipalities as well as individuals.2 5
The big objection to the practical application of the comparative
negligence rule is the difficulty for the jury to determine the pro-
portion of the party's negligence compared to damages involved.
The South Dakota court in rejecting the doctrine said, "We reject
it, not because it is unsound as a matter of logic or technical theory
or abstract speculation, but because experience has shown, as a
practical matter, that it is not workable, there being no usable yard-
stick to measure the relative fault of the parties." 26 Before reject-
ing the rule because of this element of uncertainty it must be re-
membered that juries are allowed to determine such speculative
damage cases as mental suffering and anguish, injuries from libel
and slander and other such conjectural rights of action. Where
juries inadequately or excessively award damages the courts where
comparative negligence is allowed grant new trials or rehearings
on the damages.-2 7 A study of the cases in Wisconsin and Missis-
sippi bear proof of the general satisfaction with the rule and the
few resultant appeals from the trial courts. In all jurisdictions con-
tributory negligence of the defendant must be pleaded and it is a
question for the jury as to the amount each party contributed to
the injury.
28
There is mounting dissatisfaction with the contributory negli-
gence rule and the general trend in both the federal and state sta-
tutes is toward the adoption of comparative negligence. The rela-
tively few situations where it is now used does not bear out the
impracticalness of the rule but rather a reluctance to change the
common law rule. It is evident that in view of the common law
statute in the North Dakota code 29 the change can come only
through the legislature.
22Miss. Code 51454 (1943), construed in Moore v. Abdalla, 187 Miss. 125, 19 So.2d
502 (1944), and Crosby Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Durham, 181 Miss. 559, 179 So.
285 (1938).
2sChapman v. Powers, 150 Miss. 687, 116 So. 609 (1928); Walker v. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
" Yazoo & Mississippi V. By. v. Fields, 188 Miss. 725, 195 So. 489 (1940).
25 Birdsong v. City of Clarksdale, 191 Miss. 532, 3 So.2d 827 (1941).
Wittstruck v. Lee, 62 S.D. 290, 252 N.W. 874 (1934).
" Dixon v. Breland, 192 Miss. 335, 6 So.2d 122 (1942); Lee v. Reynolds, 190 Miss. 692,
1 So.2d 487 (1941).
2Caine v. St. Louis & S.F. By., 209 Ala. 181, 95 So. 876 (1923); Fitzpatrick v.
International By., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E. 112 (1929).
21N.D. Rev. Code 1-0106 (1943).
